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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES-Consideration an essential. Exten-
sion giving holder no new rights void. Action by James Foote,
as payee, on a note against Della Foote and George Foote, as
makers; the Larimer County Bank & Trust Company, as ad-
ministrator of the estate of George Foote, being substituted for
him as defendant, while the suit was pending. The makers
promised to pay $28,000 without interest on or before two years
after date. The note contained a provision that the unpaid prin-
cipal shall bear interest "at six per cent per annum from maturity
until paid." $3,300 was paid on the principal, and after maturity
there was paid on account of interest the sum of $500. Then the
note was extended by the following indorsement:
"7-32-23. This note extended to August 16, 1928, at the
same rate of interest and same conditions."
The court held, that the plaintiff's contention that the ex-
tension agreement was without consideration and void was cor-
rect, because the plaintiff was being promised that to which he
was already entitled. The payee must receive some benefit or
the makers suffer some detriment in order to furnish consider-
ation for the extension; hence the extension was not binding.
Foote v. Larimer County Bank & Trust Co. et al. Supreme Court of
Colorado, 259 Pac. 1031.
-Albert T. Frantz.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Exclusion of Chinese Boy
from White School-Schools and School Districts-Separation
of Races in Schools. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the
recent case of Bond, State Superintendent of Education, v. Tij Fung,
et al., 114 So. 332, was confronted with the problem of designating
the proper niche a member of the Mongolian race slould occupy
in the public school system of Mississippi under the constitution
and laws of that state. Joe Tij Fung, an adult, and Joe Tin Lun,
a minor, petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus
compelling the state superintendent of education and the teach-
ers of the Dublin consolidated public school to allow Tin Lun to
register at said school. Tin Lun was a native-born citizen of
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China and had been attending said school, but the board of trus-
tees had ordered his withdrawal solely on the ground that he was
not a member of the Caucasian race. The Circuit Court granted
the writ and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the
state, where'the order of the Circuit Court was reversed and
judgment entered for the defendant.
Petitioner contended that the action of the state superin-
tendent of education in excluding him from the school had the
effect of depriVing him of a valuable property right, contrary to
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. He further contended that such action was
in violation of the Burlingame Treaty with China, whereby it is
agreed that Chinese subjects shall enjoy all the privileges of pub-
lic educational institutions under the government of the United
States which are enjoyed in this country by the citizens or sub-
jects of the most favored nation. This latter contention the
Supreme Court disposed of by holding that there was, no cause
for complaint on this ground, since petitioner was given the
same rights as we extend to some of our own citizens. He was
given the privilege of attending the colored schools, which are
established and maintained in the same manner and offer sub-
stantially the same advantages as the schools conducted by the
state for white persons. Under the laws of this country, negroes
born here are American citizens and alien negroes are not ex-
cluded by our naturalization laws. Petitioner will not therefore
be heard to complain that he has been wronged in that he has
not been accorded the privileges given to the subjects of the
most favored nation in our schools, when he has been extended
the same advantages which we accord our citizens.
The decision in this case, however, was not without its ad-
vance shadow on the horizon. To begin with, the federal courts
as early as 1878 declared that a Mongolian is not included with-
in the term "white person", and that that term refers only to
members of the Caucasian race. In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155, Fed.
Cas. No. 104. Then, in Chrisman et al. v. Brookhaven, 70 Mis-
sissippi 477, 12 So. 458, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
a city has the right to make separate provision for the races in
the matter of schools and also the right to levy taxes to support
a school established solely for white persons. Next we find a
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decision of the same court that the right to attend the public
schools is a legal right, enforceable in the courts, and that man-
damus is the proper remedy for the enforcement of such right.
Moreau v Grandich, 114 Mississippi 560, '75 So. -434. This latter
case sustains petitioner in his choice of action and in his contention
that a valuable property right is involved. His cause, however, is
dealt a fatal blow by the more recent case of Rice et al. v- Gong
Lurm et al., 139 Mississippi 760, 104 So. 105 (1925). It was there
held that "The Legislature is not compelled to provide separate
schools for each of the colored races, and, unless it does provide
such schools and provide for segregation of the other races, such
races are entitled to have the benefit of the colored public
schools." The court further declared that the purpose of the
segregation of the races in the schools is to preserve the integrity
and purity of the white race, and that the purpose of the con-
stitution was to provide schools for the white or Caucasian race
to which no other race could be admitted.
-Henry Hasle,.
'CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Power of a commission to
refuse to grant a license. This was an appeal by the defendant,
(Thdustrial Commission), from a judgment of the district court
directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus com-
manding them to issue to the plaintiff a license to conduct an
employment agency in the city of Minneapolis. (McQueen v. Wil-
liams et al, 216 N. W. 323.) The Statute provided in substance,
that upon the filing of an application with the commission they
should cause an investigation to be made as to the character -of
the applicant, or the person who is to have general ananagement.
of the office, and as to the general location of the .offices. The
application shall be rejected if the commission shall End that
any of the per.sons named are not of good moral character and
business integrity, or if there be any good and sufficient reason
within the meaning and purpose of the act for rejection such ap-
plication.
The plaintiff made application in due form for a license to
operate a class one employment agency; that he was of good
moral character and business integrity and had complied with
the requirements of the act. The commission rejected the ap-
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plication, for the reason that twenty-one class one agencies, al-
ready licensed, were located within a radius of five hundred feet
from the proposed location of the plaintiff; that no public neces-
sity existed for the additional agency; and that an additional
agency would lead to an increased competition and unwarranted
representations to attract employees and induce them to change
their employment, and to the gathering of disorderly crowds.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the business be-
ing legitimate and beneficial, a license cannot be refused arbi-
trarily to one who is within the requirements of the statute and
and has complied fully therewith. (See also Adams v. Tanner, 244
U. S. 590, Ann- Cas. 1917 D, 973).
The commission apparently acted upon the theory that, "if
there is any good and sufficient reason within the meaning of
the statute", that they might reject an application for any reason
which they deemed sufficient. If the act vested such power in
the comnission its validity would be extremely doubtful. The
purpose of the act was to protect those dealing with such agen-
cies from dishonesty, overreaching and baneful influences, and
to secure to those to whom employment is promised legitimate
employment of the character and under the conditions rep-
resented.
Whether the legislature can limit the number of such agen-
cies is not necessary to determine, for the act contains nothing
indicating any intention to do so, or any intention to confer the
power to do so on the commission. The commission plainly as-
sumed to exercise a power which it did not possess. It cannot
reject an application merely because, in its opinion, it has al-
ready licensed a sufficient number of such agencies to serve the
public needs. Such a power vested in a commission would re-
sult in the denial, to an individual, the right to engage in a legi-
timate business for any cause which the commission deemed
sufficient.
-Edward P. McGuire.
CEMETERIES-Constructive notice as to purchase of lot-
Dead Bodies-Right to be undisturbed. On November 16, 1916,
Charlie King purchased from the trustees of Wright Township,
Wayne County, Iowa, lot 165 in the cemetery in question. The
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deed was not acknowledged or recorded in the proper manner,
a stub in the record book of the county clerk being the only rec-
ord of the sale. In 1924 Cynthia Elder purchased the lot and
buried the body of her husband there. King brought an action
in equity against the township trustees and Cynthia Elder to
quiet title and to require the body of John Elder to be removed.
King v. Frame et al., Iowa, December 13, 1927.
The court held that King's deed to the lot 'not being rec-
orded in the proper manner was not constructive notice of the
sale to Cynthia Elder, and that as King had made no improve-
ments on the lot nor had buried anyone there the defendant pur-
chased without any notice whatsoever. A proper appreciation
of the duty owed to the dead, and a due regard for the feelings
of friends who survive, and the promotion of public health and
welfare, all require that bodies of the dead should not be ex-
humed, except under circumstances of extreme exigency. The
court concluded that the equities of the case were with the de-
fendant, and that the body should be permitted to "rest in peace".
All concurred.
-William Coyne.
CRIMINAL LAW-Attempt to Commit Robbery in First
Degree. Charles Rizzo and three others were convicted of an
attempt to commit robbery in the first degree. From this con-
viction the defendant Rizzo alone appeals. People v. Rizzo et al.,
Court of Appeals of New York, Nov. 22, 1927.
It appears that Rizzo and his cohorts planned to rob the
messenger of the United Lathing Company of a pay roll estim-
ated as worth about $1,200. With that idea in mind the men
went to the bank where they thought the messenger would get
the money. However, neither the messenger, Rao, or another
messenger, Previti, were at the place. The police then arrested
the would-be robbers. 'That they intended to rob the mes-
senger was clear, but does their conduct constitute an attempt
at first degree robbery? In People v. Mills, (178 New York 274).
it was held that a felonious intent alone is not enough. There
must be some overt act which would if carried out effect the re-
sult intended unless prevented by some extraneous cause. In Hyde
v. United States (225 U. S. 347.) it was held that there must be
dangerous promixity to success.
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So then in this case the .defendant could not be convicted of
an attempt to commit robbery, when the fact was that it would
have been impossible for him to do so, since the means for fur-
thering his end were not presented. A man could not be con,
victed of an attempt to murder another if he armed himself and
then could not find his intended victim.
The judgment of the court belbw was therefore reversed and
a new trial was ordered. As Rizzo was found not guilty of the
offense the others who were tried with him were not guilty also.
But they have not appealed. The court feels that the others
could have been convicted of some other penal offense and for
that reason recommends that the district attorney of Bronx
bring their case to the attention of the governor to be dealt with
in a manner as seems proper in light of this opinion.
-John P. Berscheid.
CRIMINAL LAW-Evidence obtained without producing
search warrant held inadmissible. Appellant was convicted' for
the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of
sale and was sentenced to one year's confinement in the Peni-
tentiary. Field v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 295
S. W. 258 (1927).
The appellant's bills of exception complain that the evidence
was received under these circumstances. The officers went to
appellant's place of business where he conducted a cold drink
and sandwich stand, and the officers testified that they had a
search warrant at the time but they did not know where it was.
Upon testament made by the district attorney that the state was
not relying upon the search-warrant, the appellant objected to
the admission of any testimony as to what was done and as to
what was found in his place of business by said officers in the
course of their search, because the search warrant had not been
produced. These objections of the appellant were overruled and
the officers were permitted to testify that in the said place of
business they found sixteen bottles of beer and several empty
bottles.
The court held that the overruling of the appellant's object-
ions was error under Article four of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, which prescribes that evidence obtained in searching
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a place of business for intoxicating liquor without producing a
seirch warrant is inadmissible. In accord see Gornman v. State, 296
S. W. 533; Stokes v. State, 296 S. W. 1108; Chqpin v. State, 296 S.
W. 1095.
The court also permitted the officers to testify that they
found a drunken man lying down in defendant's place of busi-
ness. The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, offered to
prove that the man found drunk in his place of business had
stated to the appellant that he was too drunk to drive his car,
and that he wanted to lie down and sober up. This was offered
by way of explaining the presence of the drfinken man on the
premises. This offer of proof By the appellant was objected to
and excluded.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was error to ex-
clude this testimony of appellant's. The reason given by the
Texas Court is, that if the state had the right to prove the pre-
sence of the drunken man on the appellant's premises as an in-
criminating fact, surely the.appellant had the right to explain it.
This, by way of showing that the presence of the said driunken
man was in no way connected with the supposed unlawful pos-
session of intoxicants by the appellant.
There was no error in receiving evidence of the search of a
field near appellant's place of business but not occupied or
claimed by him. (294 S. W. 555.)
-Ivan. J. LeBlanc.
EVIDENCE-Admission of liquor seized by State Troopers
in a prosecution by the Federal Government. The defendants,
Gambino and Lima, were arrested by two New York state troop-
ers, near the Canadian border; their automobile (while occupied
by Gambino and therefore within the protection accorded to his
person) was searched without a warrant, and intoxicating liquor
found therein was seized. They, the liquor and other property
taken were immediately turned over to a federal deputy collector
of customs for prosecution in the federal court for northern New
York. There the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to
import and transport liquor in violation of the National Prohi-
bition Act. They immediately moved for the suppression of the
liquor as evidence and for its return, on the ground that the ar-
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rest, the search, and the seizure were without a warrant and
without probable cause, in yiolation of the fourth, fifth and .sixth
Amendments of the federal Constitution. The motion was de-
nied, the evidence introduced at the trial, and the defendants
were convicted and on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the
judgment of conviction was affirmed. In the above judgments
neither court rendered an opinion and this Court granted a writ
of certiorari. Gambino et al v. United States, (48 Supreme Court
Rep. 137).
The government contended that the evidence was admissible
because there was probable cause (Carrol v. United States, 267 U. S.
132), and also because it was not shown that the state troopers
were at the time of the arrest, search, and seizure, agents of the
United States. The defendants 'contended that there was not
probable cause, and the state troopers are to be deemed agents
of the United States because section 26, title 2, of the National
Prohibition Act imposes the duty of arrest and seizure where
liquor is being illegally transported, not only upon the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants and inspectors, but
also upon "any officer of the law".
The Mullan-Gage Law, the state prohibition act, had been
repealed in New York and in the memorandum filed by the Gov-
ernor approving the act which repealed that law, he declared
that all peace officers, thus including state troopers, are required
to aid in the enforcement of federal law "with a s much force and
vigor as they would enforce any state law or local ordinance",
and the repeal of the Mullan-Gage Law .should make no differ-
ence in their action, except that thereafter the peace officers inust
take the offender to the federal court for prosecution. Aid so
given was accepted and acted on by the federal officials.
The court properly held that the admission in evidence of
the liquor wrongfully seized violated rights of the defendants
guaranteed by the fourth and fifth Amendments. The wrongful
arrest, search, and seizure were made solely on behalf of the
United States. The evidence so secured was the foundation for
the prosecution and supplied the only evidence of guilt. While
the troopers were not shown to have acted under the direction
of federal officials in making the arrest, nevertheless the defend-
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ants rights under the Constitutidn were as effectively invaded
(Silverhorne v. United States, 251 U. S. 385).
While the main- decision in this case may be said to be in
harmony with our American ideal of security from unreasonable
searches and seizures, it nevertheless cites some dangerous pre-
cedent, which if followed will lead to a total destruction of in-
dividual liberty. The only apparent reason for the rejection of
the evidence here sought to be introduced, was the fact that the
state, trqopers were acting for the federal government. Had
they been acting for the state of New York the evidence would
have been admissible in a Federal Court. (Weeks v. United States,
267 U. S. 383, Center v. United States, 267 U. S. 575, Dodge v.
United States, 272'U. S. 530, and Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S.
465). In all of the above cited cases the evidence sought to be
introduced was acquired by state officials who were not at the
time of the arrests and unlawful seizures, acting for the Federal
Government. The evidence thus obtained, while not admissibTe
in the state courts was allowed to be used in federal courts and
held to be constitutional. The reason for such abuse of the in-
dividuals rights was not pointed out by the court and there ap-
pears to be no logical reason for such a violation of the Consti-
tution of the United States. The only apparent reason is that
the Supreme Court of the United States has resorted to another
fiction in an effort to bring about the enforcement of the National
Prohibition Amendment. According to this decision, in a state
where local prohibition acts have not been abolished, the state
might use evidence illegally obtained by federal officials, in a
prosecution under the state law and in the state courts. I know
of no other criminal cases in which courts have gone so far as to
deny. protection from unlawful searches and seizures, but if
courts in liquor cases are allowed to establish such dangerous
precedent there will be no end to the destruction of rights pro-
tected by our constitution.
-Edward P. McGuire.
FALSE PRETENSES-Auto Finance. The Central States
Finance Corporation of Chicago had made an agreement with
the plaintiff in error, to discount customer's notes taken by
Snyder who was an automobile salesman. The plaintiff in
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error had a special form of judgment note, application for insur-
ance and purchaser's statement, and dealer's statement and -re-
commendation. These were supplied to the purchasers when
buying a car. It was agreed that the plaintiff in error should
draw a sight draft on the Central States Finance Corporation,
when a note was to be discounted. This draft to accompany the
note, purchaser's statement and dealer's recommendation.(People v.
Snyder, Supreme Court of Illinois, Oct. 22, 1927.)
A number of transactions were carried out between Snyder
and the finance corporation which were regular. On November
19, 1924, the plaintiff in error drew a sight draft on the corpora-
tion, accompaning it with a note purporting, to be signed by
Charles W. Holmes. "Thi's note was proved to be fictitious. It
was later found out that Snyder had defrauded the Corporation
in three other transactions.
Snyder was prosecuted under an indictment charging him
with obtaining money and crrdit from the finance corporation by
means of a confidence game. He was tried and found guilty of
the charge. The plaintiff in error now brings writ of error.
The court held that the statute operating against games did
not apply to Snyder. To be guilty of a confidence garrie one
must have obtained the confidence of the swindled person
through some false representation or device. (319 Ill., 168; 310
Ill., 613.) But in Snyder's case the money was not obtained
through any means such as the above, Snyder had obtained the con-
fidence of the Finance Corporation through honest dealings insofar
as they were regular business practices. Thus a conviction on a
confidence game charge would not stand. The plaintiff in error
might be charged with obtaining money under false pretenses
or some other statute, but not under the statute under which he
was convicted. The judgment of the court below was therefore
reversed.
-John P. Berscheid.
INSURANCE-State's power to refuse non-resident insur-
ance company licence to do business in state-Interstate Com-
merce and Insurance Companies. The petitioners are receivers
of the Employers Mutual Insurance and Service Company, a
Maryland corporation, and they sued the defendants, a Minn-
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esota corporation, for the amount of an assessment made upon
the insured, pursuant to a policy for "strike insurance" issued by
the company.
The defendants contended that the Insurance Company (hence
its receivers) cannot maintain this action in a court of Minnesota,
because they did not, before writing the policy, comply with the
Minnesota law relating to foreign insurance companies doing
business within the state. Bothwell et al v. Buckbee-Mears Co., 48
Sup. Ct. Rep. 124.
The statutory requirements were not met with, and the con-
tract was effected by the company sending a representative into
the state, who' solicited the insurance, defendant filling out the
application blank in Minnesota and sending it together with a
check for the first premium to the company's office in Maryland.
Upon receipt of this letter the policy was signed by the company
in Maryland and mailed to the defendant.
Justice Brandeis, in affirming the state's approval of the
defendant's stand, said: "Such insurance contract made by a
corporation domiciled in another .state, is not 'interstate com-
merce'." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.
S. 95, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71.
Hence Minnesota had the power to prohibit the Employers Com-
pany from doing business within the state without first comply-
ing with its law s, and could refuse the aid of its courts in en-
forcing a contract which involved the violation of its laws.
Chattanooga etc., v Denson, 189 U. S. 408, Interstate Amusement
Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 560, Mundy v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.
S. 499.
"The contract was not a later independent act, but grew out
of the illegal solicitation, and was part of the transaction, con-
sequently it was tainted with illegality. Because of such taint,
the state would have the right to refuse to enforce it although
made in Maryland. Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93 Amer-
ican Fire Ins. Co., v. King Lumber Co., 250 U. S. 2.
"But the contract in this case by its very terms was obnoxious
to the Minnesota Law viz :--The insurance company agreed to
defend, on behalf of the insured, any suits or legal proceedings
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against the insured as a result of strikes etc. No place of pay-
ment for losses was specified, therefore by common law, it would
be in Minnesota. Penn etc., Ins. Co. v..Meyer, 25 S. Ct. 485. The
insurance company reserved the right to inspect the insured's
factory, books of account, papers of the business, and to inter-
rogate persons connected with the company. All appraisals in
adjustment of losses were to be done in Minnesota. Consequently
all these activities of the insurance company, within State of
Minnesota, were prohibited by a valid statute.
"Consequeptly, by the universal rule of law, a state may re-
fuse to enforce a contract which provides for doing within it an
act prohibited by its laws.
"The receivers contended that since the contract was made
in Maryland and was valid there, it was not subject to the pro-
hibitions of the Minnesota law, and Minnesota could not refuse
the aid of its courts from enforcing it."
They based this contention principally on Allgeyer v. Loidsiacza,
165 U. S. 578, one of the leading cases on insurance contracts.
At first blush one might think that this case is in point, but upon
investigation the discrepancy is plain. -In the Allgeyer Case supra
A made a contract of insurance with the B company, in New
York, insuring goods in Louisiana. The contract was valid in
New York. By the terms of the policy, A was to mail certain
notifications to the B company, such notices being condition pre-
cedent to attaching of the risk. A statute of Louisiana pro-
hibited such acts in that state, to effect insurance on property
within the state, by any insurance company not complying with
the laws of Louisiana. The B company hkd not complied with
these laws.
Juistice Peckham said: "We think that statute is a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment and that it deprives the de-
fendants of their liberty without due process. The 'liberty' men-
tioned in that amendment means, not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the physical restraint of his person, as by incarcer-
ation, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen
to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
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avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the.purposes above mentioned."
The mere fact that .a citizen may be within the limits of a
particular state does not prevent his making a contract outside
its limits while he himself remains within it. Millken v. Pratt 28
Am. Rep. 241, Tilden v. Blair 22 L. Ed. 632.
The giving of the notice is a mere collateral matter. It is
not the contract itself, but is an act performed ptirsuant to* a
valid contract, which the state had no right or jurisdiction to
prevent its citizens from making outside the limits of the state.
The Allgeyer Case holds that a state .may not prohibit a
citizen or a resident from doing an act in another state.- The
Bothwell case does not prohibit or tend to prohibit any act out-
side of the State of Minnesota.
Under the Allgeyer case the parties had the constitutional
right to make this contract in Maryland, despite the Minnesota
prohibition. But the company had no constitutional right to
solicit the insurance in Minnesota.
In the Allgeyer case, the sending of the notification was
merely collateral. Nothing had been done, or was to be done,
that would cause the foreign company to come into the state and
carry on any activities. The entire transaction took place out-
side of the state.
In the Bothwell case the court is merely protecting a sover-
eign right. They do not prohibit or punish the acts. But the
court says, "Unless you comply with our requirements you can-
not expect the aid of our courts." The company violated the
law of the state in solicitation, and in carrying out the policy
would continue to violate the law; it is not logical to suppose
that after this violation the courts of Minnesota would aid them.
The acts in the Allgeyer case grew out of the contract which
was valid at its inception, but in the Bothwell case the contract
was a part of the illegal solicitation and furthermore contem-
plated still further illegal acts in the state of Minnesota.
In the Allgeyer case the "liberty" referred to, "Is liberty of
natural, not artificial persons". And as said by Justice Brandeis
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in a previous case: "A state may not, except in the reasonable
exercise of the police power, impair the freedom of contract of
a.eitiztei, but it can prevent th4 foreign insurers from sheltering
themselves under his freedom."
-E. F. McClarnon.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Workman's Compensation
Act-Incident of Vocation. James H. Norris was killed while
employed in unloading cans of milk from railway cars placed in
the yard of his employer, the New York Central Railroad Com-
pany.
On the night of October first, 1925, the workman, Norris,
was assigned to unload milk cans from a car placed on a rail-
way track just north of one of the railways called A, and near the
convergence of Eleventh Avenue. Norris came to work at about
eleven o'clock at night and made his preliminary check up on the
number of cans. He then proceeded to deliver cans on board a
consignee's motor truck, making one delivery, and then follcwed
a temporary lapse of time until the motor truck of the consignee
would return. So at about one o'clock in the morning Norris was
seen walking along roadway A, easterly toward Eleventh Ave-
nue, when perhaps he was headed for the flag shanty in which to
warm himself, or to go to the yard-master's toilet. He was
struck by a motor truck at Eleventh Avenue where the two road-
ways converged, and he died as a result of the injury. Questions
arose whether the State Industrial Board justly found, under the
circumstances stated, that Norris was in the course of his em-
ployment when the motor truck ran him down, in spite of the
fact that he was not actually at work at the time at the spot
where he was usually employed.
This is a clear case of the doctrine under Workman's Com-
pensation Acts relating to injuries following from acts which
are merely incidental to the vocation. The .incidental right of
ceasing to work and of going to a comfort station is well recog-
nized as being a natural part of the every day working world.
The cases are quite unanimous on that proposition. See North
Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, where a locomotive
engineer who was killed while temporarily going to his boarding
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house situated nearby was held to be in the course of his employ-
ment, and which case cites additional cases following the rule.
When the courts follow the rule as laid down in the prin-
cipal case, Norris v. New York Cen. R. R. Co., 246 N. Y., 307, 158
N. E., 879, then justice to the working man and his family will
be accomplished to the fullest extent; but for the few cases which
go to the contrary, the injustice is most apparent.
-Seymour Weisberger.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Religious Liberties-Read-
ing of Bible in Public Schools. This case presents a question that
has, of late years, been one of great interest in many of our
largest cities, not only to constitutional lawyers, but to the gen-
eral public as well. It attempts to .determine just what religious
exercises or instructions are within the prohibitions of the state
constitution defining religious liberty, forbidding the use of the
public moneys for religious teaching, or for the support of reli-
gious sects or societies, providing that no one should be com-
pelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or main-
tain any ministry against his consent, and that no preference
shall be given to any religious establishment or place of worship.
(Kaplan v. Independent School District of Virignida et al. Supreme
Court of Minnesota, 1927. 214 N. W. 18.)
The first amendment to the Federal Constitution, prohibiting
Congress from making any law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, leaves the states
free to enact such laws as they may deem proper in respect to
religion, restrained only by limitations of the respective state
constitutions. Thus it is a question of interpretation of the
state constitution alone. But although the state constitutions
on the subject are substantially the same, some of them precisely
so, the courts are far from being in harmony on the point in-
volved.
In the case before us, the school board of the independent
school district of Virginia, Minnesota, was requested by the
Ministerial Association of that city to place a copy of the Bible
in every schoolroom, and to direct the superintendent to make
suitable selections, to be read daily, without note or comment, by
the teacher-in! each room at the opening of school. This was
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done, a copy of the King James version of the Bible being placed
in each schoolroom. Where the parent of any child objected to
such reading, or the pupil himself objected, he might leave the
room. The parents of the children attending the school in-
cluded Protestants, Roman Catholics, Christian Scientists, and
Jews. The action was brought to enjoin the reading of these
selections in the schools. The lower court found as conclusions
of law that "the readifig of the Bible in the public schools does
not constitute any infringement of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights, and is lawful," denying the injunction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding
that it did not violate the following provisions of the Minnesota
Constitution :
"The right of every man to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, shall never be infringed, nor shall
any man be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
worship, or to maintain any .... ministry against his consent;
nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of con-
.science be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishment or mode of worship."
In 1895, and again in 1913, the Attorney General had given
his opinion that the reading of the Bible in the public schools
was unconstitutional. Section 2848, G. S. Minnesota, 1923,
makes the opinions of the Attorney General as to school matters
controlling law until overruled by the courts. In this case his
opinion did not carry much weight.
In its opinion, the court quotes section 2906, G. S. 1923,
which reads: "The teachers in all public schools shall give in-
structions in morals," etc., and then eloquently exclaims: "What
is more natural than turning to that Book for moral precepts which
for ages has been regarded by the majority of the peoples of the
most civilized nations as the fountain of moral teachings?" But
the court fails to distinguish between the teaching of general
morals and the instilling of the basic principles of a particular
religion. If there were but one bible, the court's reasoning would
be more convincing. -But "that Book" cannot be construed as a
general term, and used as a "fountain -of moral teachings" for
the adherents of all religions. Practically every religion has
its own Bible, and that, in most cases, radically different from
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all others. True, the person reading the selection is ordered to
make no note or comment, but how can that satisfy the religions
that refuse to allow their members a private interpretation of
their own Bible?
It is argued that the fact that a pupil may retire during the
reading prevents it from violating anyone's rights. But, as said
by Chief Justice Wilson in his able dissenting opinion: "To
excuse some children is a distinct preference in favor of those
who remain and is a discrimination against those who retire.
The exclusion puts the child in a class by himself. It makes him
religiously conspicuous. It subjects him to religious stigma.
It may provoke odious epithets. His situation calls for courage."
The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in this con-
nection represents the majority opinion. There is, however, an
imposing array of authorities holding squarely the opposite.
Probably the most important case holding the other way is that
of State ex rel. Weiss v. School District, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N. W. 967.
The Minnesota Constitution contains the same provisions as that
of Wisconsin, and was presumably adopted because of Min-
nesota's territorial connection with that state. Nevertheless, Min-
nesota has placed upon the same provisions an interpretation directly
contrary to that of Wisconsin. In the Wisconsin case it was
held:
"The 'sectarian instruction' prohibited in the common
schools by Const. art. 10, sect. 3, is instruction in the doctrine
held by one or other of the various religious sects, and not by the
rest; and hence the reading of the Bible in such schools comes
within this prohibition, since each, with few exceptions, bases
its peculiar doctrines upon some portion of the Bible, the reading
of which tends to inculcate those doctrines. Such practice can
receive no sanction from. the fact that pupils are not compelled
to remain in the school while it is being read, for the withdrawal
of a portion of them at such time would tend to destroy the
equality and uniformity of the pupils sought to be established
and protected by the Constitution."
In People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, it
was held that the reading of the Bible, singing of hymns, and
repeating of the Lord's Prayer in a public school is violative of
the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing the free exercise and en-
joyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination.
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Herold v. Parish Board School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So.
116, held that the reading of the Bible, including the Old and
New Testament, in public schools was a preference given to
Christians, and a discrimination against Jews, and in violation
of the Constitution.
In the case at hand, the dissenting opinion of the Chief
Justice seems to be much .sounder, both on principles of reason
and of policy than the majority opinion. He bases it mainly on
the Constitutional provision, "nor shall any control of or inter-
ference with the rights of conscience be permitted", which clause
the majority opinion ignored altogether. Rights of conscience
in religion he defines as "the privilege of resting in peace or con-
tentment according to one's own judgment"--"a recognition of
a right to religious complacency"--and argues to the effect that
the individual may not only worship as his conscience dictates,
but also has the right not to be annoyed by those things which
directly interfere with what he genuinely believes to be right,
even though they act upon only an incidental, but to his mind, an
important angle of his worship.
We are inclined to agree with him when he says that to re-
quire Jewish children to read the New Testament, which extols
Christ as the Messiah, is to tell them that their religious teach-
ings at home are untrue, and a violation of the rights of con-
science. We are inclined to agree with him when he calls it an
interference with the rights of conscience to compel a Catholic
child to read in school a Bible whose dedication assails the pope
as "the man of sin", and accuses him of desiring to keep the
people in ignorance and darkness. Certainly no one will dispute
with him .in this:
"The conclusion reached will necessarily be the source of
much religious strife. It was the intention of the men who
framed our Constitution to avoid all of the evils of religious con-
troversies. There is no fight like a religious fight. The conclu-
sion now reached offers a new qualification for members of local
school boards and injects in school elections an element which
will be detrimental to the general welfare. It is, indeed, the
beginning of religion in our civil affairs. This decision will not
settle anything. It merely adds fuel to the flames."
-Thomas I. Griffin.
